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The issue of admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations is central to a criminal 
justice system as a mechanism through which to prevent overzealous prosecution by the state and 
ensure protection of human rights. As such, any court that deals with criminal cases has to evaluate 
evidence before it is admitted. This article argues that the Traditional Courts Bill (TCB)1 does not 
provide for a mode of dealing with evidence obtained as a result of human rights violations. To 
substantiate this argument, the article reviews the current Bill, and reflects on the challenges that 
arise with regard to evidence obtained in this way. The article contextualises section 35(5) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and discusses the practical difficulties of applying it 
under the current Bill. The article concludes with recommendations for measures that can ensure that 
accused persons are not prejudiced when appearing before the court. 
Much has been written on the Traditional Courts 
Bill (TCB), focusing in particular on the need to 
balance the law and tradition, as well as issues 
of legal pluralism in South Africa, and offering 
a comparative analysis of various aspects of 
traditional leaders’ role in justice and crime 
prevention.2 There is a wealth of literature on the 
application of section 35(5) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, yet insights 
on its application to traditional courts remain a 
grey area.3 The attempts by the Executive to 
formalise the operation of traditional courts, and 
use the Bill of Rights as a foundational principle, 
point to the need for a clear framework on how 
to deal with evidence obtained as a result of 
human rights violations. 
Jurisprudence on the application of section 
35(5) of the Constitution requires that the 
collection of evidence before a trial meet certain 
criteria. For instance, an accused should be 
informed of the right to legal representation 
before s/he is charged.4 Furthermore, s/he 
should not be subjected to torture or inhuman 
treatment to extract evidence.5 The right to a fair 
trial has constitutional safeguards that include 
an accused’s right to be informed promptly 
of the charge against him or her,6 the right to 
remain silent,7 and the consequences of not 
remaining silent.8 In addition, s/he should not be 
compelled to make a confession or admission 
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that could be used in evidence against him or 
her,9 s/he should be brought to court within 48 
hours,10 and be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty.11 It follows that if an investigating authority 
disregards these safeguards while collecting 
evidence, a violation of the constitutional rights 
of the accused occurs. The problem with 
the TCB in its current formulation (as will be 
shown later) is that the traditional courts will 
not adjudicate cases investigated by the police. 
This sets up an environment for the violation 
of an accused’s rights by any person or entity 
involved in the pre-trial investigations before 
s/he is brought to a traditional court.
If the pre-trial investigations are not placed into 
perspective, the TCB’s objective to apply the Bill 
of Rights in traditional courts is defeated. There 
is no available literature on how the existing 
or revised (prospective) traditional courts will 
deal with admission of evidence that has not 
been collected by a formal investigative agency 
such as the police. The human rights of an 
individual have to be respected, and as such, 
how evidence was collected during the pre-
trial stage should be scrutinised.12 This article 
evaluates how the TCB deals with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations in 
relation to section 35(5) of the Constitution. 
The TCB’s formulation of the operation of 
traditional courts contains a number of key 
points. Firstly, the parties that seek to appear 
before the traditional courts need to do so 
voluntarily and with consent.13 Secondly, the 
traditional courts should incorporate the notion 
of living customary law, which is developed 
by the people who practise it and live by 
its norms.14 Thirdly, the TCB should protect 
against discrimination by encouraging full 
participation of all members of a community, 
regardless of gender.15 The defining feature of 
these arguments is the need for a progressive 
development of customary law through a 
traditional court’s jurisdiction in the cases 
it adjudicates.
Much of the current debate about traditional 
courts has been centred on whether these 
courts should have jurisdiction over both 
criminal and civil cases, and the jurisdictional 
boundaries of individual courts.16 However, 
commentators have not yet addressed the 
issue of admission of evidence that is obtained 
unconstitutionally. The fact that the traditional 
courts have criminal jurisdiction subjects 
them to section 35(5) of the Constitution. We 
therefore urgently need a conversation about 
the admission of such evidence as part of the 
deliberations on this Bill.
Review of the Traditional Courts Bill 
in relation to evidence obtained 
through human rights violations
The current TCB does not contain any clause 
that determines how evidence should be 
collected or admitted. The clause that most 
closely addresses evidence states that ‘[t]he 
customary law of procedure and evidence 
applies in traditional courts’.17 
This provision sets out the law of evidence and 
procedure as customary law, but does not 
articulate what the content of such customary 
law is. This poses a danger, as the application of 
customary law is consequently left open to the 
subjective definitions of a given community.18
The complexities of customary law arguably 
stem from the system of legal pluralism.19 South 
Africa has various customary laws for its diverse 
groups of people.20 While this clause ensures 
the applicability of different customary laws 
in different communities, its subjectivity also 
presents some dangers in application. 
Because the TCB has no provision for dealing 
with evidence obtained through human rights 
violations, it raises questions as to how section 
35(5) would be applied. This section provides: 
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Evidence obtained in a manner that 
violates any right in the bill of rights 
must be excluded if the admission of 
that evidence would render the trial 
unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice.21
This section presents a constitutional directive 
that requires a court to exclude evidence 
obtained through human rights violations, 
subject to either of two conditions: firstly, 
where this admission renders a trial unfair, and 
secondly, where it leads to a maladministration 
of justice.22 The court only exercises its 
discretion not to admit evidence after subjecting 
it to these two conditions, which provide 
objective criteria that are used to interpret 
this provision.23 
The clause in the TCB that requires application 
of the customary law of procedure and 
evidence in traditional courts requires a 
traditional leader to subject the pre-trial facts to 
the objective criteria under section 35(5). The 
challenge is that under the current formulation 
of the TCB, the traditional court neither 
adjudicates cases investigated by the police 
nor offers any alternative option for conducting 
investigations. As such, a traditional leader may 
depart from the objective criteria under section 
35(5) because there is no investigative body that 
will be subjected to this inquiry. 
The subjective application of customary law, 
when viewed against the objective criteria 
under section 35(5), is bound to violate the 
right to equality.24 This violation occurs when 
customary laws are applied differently to 
similar facts, just because those facts are 
presented before different traditional courts in 
different communities. Consider a hypothetical 
situation, where different communities apply 
different consequences for theft or assaults. 
The severity of these consequences may differ 
greatly, illustrating how inequalities may result 
from different customary laws being applied. 
The universal application of section 35(5) is 
bound to curb the discretion that the traditional 
leaders in these community courts currently 
use in settling issues. As such, we can see 
how a subjective application of section 35(5) 
on communities violates the right to equality.25 
The memorandum of the TCB sets out 
that the guiding principles for the proposed 
court require an interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights in a manner that promotes the values 
that ‘underlie an open and democratic 
society, based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom’.26 To make this principle real 
in criminal cases would require that the 
subjective variability of customary law be 
tempered through the application of the more 
objective criteria under section 35(5) of the 
Constitution. 
Another guiding principle in the memorandum 
requires that the traditional courts interpret 
‘any legislation; and when developing the 
common law or customary law’, promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.27 While the development of common 
law is beyond the scope of the proposed 
courts, the development of customary law 
under this new genre of formal courts must 
provide clarity on the admissibility of evidence 
obtained through human rights violations. This 
involves developing normative rules in the 
TCB that ensure that there is a proper process 
of investigating cases that upholds the right 
to a fair trial. Customary jurisprudence that 
engages the objective criteria under section 
35(5) should also be developed organically. 
Where such clarity cannot be given, the basis 
for the development of living customary law is 
not adequately grounded.28 
The requirement that the traditional courts 
do not adjudicate cases that have been 
investigated by the police creates grounds for 
the possible violation of an accused’s pre-trial 
rights.29 The lack of clarity on how such cases 
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are investigated exacerbates the problem. While 
the TCB seeks to uphold the spirit of the Bill of 
Rights, its lack of insight on how the traditional 
courts will deal with issues around the collection 
and admission of evidence poses a potentially 
dangerous predicament. As such, it is hard to 
guarantee that the admissibility of evidence 
obtained through human rights violations will 
be minimised.30 The subjective application of 
a customary law procedure would likely be in 
conflict with the application of the objective 
criteria under section 35(5).  
One may argue that traditional courts should 
be bound to the same rules as any other 
court and as such, pre-trial investigations do 
not necessarily protect an accused’s pre-
trial rights and the subsequent admission 
of evidence. While this may be true, the 
accused in a traditional court hearing might 
only receive protection once a superior court 
such as the High Court reviews the judgment 
of the traditional court – which might only be 
established after an innocent person’s time 
has been wasted and his or her resources 
squandered, or credit injured.31 Principles that 
are developed by the traditional courts on how 
to deal with evidence obtained through human 
rights violations may be subjected to review by 
the High Court,32 which will create greater case 
backlogs in the already stretched high courts 
across South Africa.33
The reference to the application of the Bill of 
Rights by the traditional courts is based on 
two key considerations: firstly, that women are 
accorded full and equal participation when they 
are before the court,34 and secondly, that there 
should be no discrimination against vulnerable 
persons such as children, the elderly, youth, 
the indigent and persons with disabilities, or 
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity.35 However, applying the Bill’s current 
general procedural and substantive aspirations, 
without considering the nature of the evidence 
that is being admitted, will result in further 
discrimination, because such evidence violates 
one’s right to a fair trial under section 35(5) of 
the Constitution. 
Technical aspects such as evidence obtained 
through human rights violations, which would 
normally be picked up by a lawyer, are not easily 
identified in the traditional court environment 
because of the exclusion of legal representation 
in the proposed courts.36 Subjecting traditional 
courts to the same rules as common law courts 
fails because of peculiarities such as these, for 
example the lack of legal representation and 
the fact that cases are adjudicated by untrained 
officers. Jurisprudence, however, indicates that 
customary law should not be recognised at 
the expense of human rights violations.37 The 
tensions inherent in the technical aspects of 
trials in traditional courts can only be resolved if 
both these courts and contemporary courts are 
required to apply the Bill of Rights consistently.
As noted earlier, the application of section 
35(5) of the Constitution requires a practical 
evaluation of how unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence affects the fairness of a trial of an 
accused, or impacts the court’s administration 
of justice.38 With the Bill of Rights as the 
foundation of the application of the TCB, 
section 35(5) requires that a framework be 
provided under the TCB to speak to the 
collection and admission of evidence. These 
principles are easily resolved in other courts 
because investigation processes routinely 
question how evidence is collected and then 
subsequently admitted in court.39 An example 
of such a procedure is a trial within a trial, which 
tests the voluntariness of the collection of the 
evidence. This kind of mechanism is not evident 
in the TCB.40 
Evidence that is obtained through human 
rights violations likely does not fit within the 
larger framework that guides the operation of 
the proposed traditional courts under the TCB. 
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The drafters may also have had no intention 
to apply section 35(5) to the traditional 
courts. But these two arguments point to a 
dangerous predicament. 
Firstly, there will be a selective application of the 
Bill of Rights by the traditional courts. This will 
defeat the purpose of the TCB, which seeks to 
eliminate any abuse in the prospective traditional 
court process, to protect the public interest, 
and to ensure accountability.41 These kinds of 
abuses of the traditional courts were illustrated 
in the case of Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo v S,42 
where the king of the abaThembu, Dalindyebo, 
was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment 
for crimes he committed against his subjects 
in the former Transkei. Dalindyebo claimed 
that he was exercising his authority as the 
king in enforcing law and order.43 Consider a 
hypothetical where Dalindyebo presided over 
these criminal cases in a traditional court under 
the TCB. An application of section 35(5) of the 
Constitution would expect that Dalindyebo (as 
the investigator) would be questioned as to how 
he had collected the evidence and adduced it 
in the traditional court. Furthermore, he would 
have to make a decision with regard to the 
admissibility of this evidence by scrutinising its 
effect on the fairness of a trial or the disrepute 
on the administration of justice.
The introduction to the Dalindyebo appeal in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal is instructive in how it 
shows a distaste for the violation of civil liberties 
that the case illustrated:
Imagine a tyrannical and despotic king who 
set fire to the houses, crops and livestock 
of subsistence farmers living within his 
jurisdiction, in full view of their families, 
because they resisted his attempts to 
have them evicted, or otherwise did not 
immediately comply with his orders. 
Imagine the king physically assaulting 
three young men so severely that even 
his henchmen could not bear to watch. 
Imagine the same king kidnapping the wife 
and children of a subject he considered to 
be a dissident in order to bend the latter to 
his will.44 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s confirmation of 
the convictions is evidence that constitutional 
values cannot be sacrificed at the altar of 
customary expedience. 
Secondly, the prospective traditional courts 
are not expected to handle cases that are 
being investigated by the police. The relevant 
clause provides that ‘a traditional court may 
not hear and determine a dispute which … 
is being investigated by the South African 
Police Service’.45
However, under the TCB these courts may 
handle common criminal cases such as theft, 
breaking and entering, assaults, receiving stolen 
property and malicious damage to property.46  
This indicates a lack of clarity about how 
traditional leaders should handle these kinds 
of cases. A literal interpretation shows that the 
investigation of a case by the police neutralises 
the jurisdiction of the traditional court. Where 
the traditional court handles a case that has 
not been subjected to any investigation, 
two scenarios arise. On the one hand, a 
traditional leader may apply local traditional 
law subjectively and based on local practice, 
using his discretion to decide on the fate of an 
accused in a case before him without paying 
regard to any particular rules or principles.47 
The alternative, objective approach would 
require that the traditional leader uses 
established rules (for example under section 
35[5]) to evaluate the facts before exercising 
discretion to admit the evidence. Under the 
Bill’s current formulation, both decisions are 
improper. While the subjective application likely 
leads to the absence of a fair trial, the objective 
application of the criteria under section 35(5) 
may erode the integrity of the customary law of 
a given community.  
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The TCB’s current formulation advocates 
for the subjective approach. However, an 
objective approach would improve the quality 
of decisions because it would contextualise the 
traditional courts’ collection, and subsequent 
admission, of such evidence. The current 
Bill does not offer a framework for such 
an approach. The lack of an investigative 
mechanism for the investigation of cases (such 
as the police) affects the ways that courts can 
use the evidence that is collected, because it 
may be prejudicial to the accused.48  
Thirdly, under the proposed TCB the courts 
may only exercise their jurisdiction where the 
parties consent to it. Where the voluntariness 
of such consent is not adequately evaluated, 
the Bill does not offer a sufficient measure 
to deal with possible abuse of the court 
process. It may be that the traditional leader, 
as a presiding officer, is involved both in the 
investigation of the allegations and in decisions 
around the admission of evidence.49 Although 
his engagement may be well intentioned, his 
involvement may create the perception of an 
unfair trial for the accused. This is in contrast 
to the contemporary judicial system that does 
not allow judicial officers to investigate and 
adjudicate a case. The customary practice 
opens the risk that traditional courts may admit 
evidence that is unfairly obtained. 
In essence, then, the traditional leader may act 
as investigator and judge in the same case. This 
creates a possibility of bias on his part. Since he 
is not an investigative entity like the police, he 
runs the risk of acting like a vigilante.50 In such 
cases, it makes it harder to use the objective 
criteria under section 35(5).
The traditional court’s exercise of its jurisdiction 
does not draw a clear line between the 
investigation and adjudication of cases. 
Consequently, cases that are not investigated 
by the police will most likely be adjudicated by 
the traditional courts, with no formalised rules or 
principles. As such, there may well be a possible 
admission of evidence that violates the rights 
of an accused. Although the TCB envisages 
traditional courts presiding over cases such as 
assaults and petty thefts, even these ‘simple’ 
cases have real effects on individuals. It may be 
that a result is viewed as synonymous with a 
conviction, even though it is intended to be of a 
reconciliatory or compensatory nature.   
The context of section 35(3) of 
the Constitution
Section 35(5) presumes that evidence is 
admissible unless it renders a trial unfair, or is 
detrimental to the administration of justice.51 
Jurisprudence on this section has developed 
around issues of pointing out suspects, illegal 
searches, illegal surveillance, autoptic evidence, 
and evidence obtained through the improper 
treatment of witnesses.52 The violation of these 
rights is most often perpetrated by the police 
or investigative bodies that are involved in the 
collection of evidence.53 The question here is 
how evidence obtained through human rights 
violations fits into the bigger picture of how 
the proposed traditional courts operate under 
the TCB. 
The Bill of Rights underscores rights such 
as the right to freedom and security of the 
person, privacy, expression and movement, 
and the right to a fair trial.54 An accused may 
also exercise the right to remain silent once 
s/he has been informed of the charge against 
him or her.55 Other guarantees include the right 
not to be compelled to make a confession 
or admission that could be used in evidence 
against an accused; the right to be brought 
to court within 48 hours; and the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty.56 All of 
these protections safeguard against the violation 
of an accused’s rights.
The police, as the chief investigating authority, 
are expected to respect these safeguards. 
Case law shows that section 35(5) extends to 
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other individuals in a similar capacity. Two cases 
illustrate this position. S v Songezo Mini and 4 
others (Mini) subjected the evidence obtained 
by security officers to scrutiny in terms of 
section 35(5) before admitting it.57 In S v Hena, 
the court held that section 35(5) also applies 
to situations where the police abdicate their 
statutory duty to investigate crimes by sub-
contracting the task to anti-crime committees 
that gather evidence by seriously and 
deliberately violating the constitutional rights of 
an accused person.58 Research has also shown 
that vigilantes are used in this way, in other 
words, to take on the role of the police to collect 
evidence or investigate cases.59 Taken together, 
these cases show that other groups, whether 
lay persons or security operatives (like guards), 
have to ensure that the law is not abused. 
Traditional leaders who collect evidence in the 
course of presiding over a traditional court, may 
act, or be at risk of being viewed, as vigilantes in 
doing so. They must therefore be subject to the 
same constraints on their methods.
The laws of procedure should not be limited to 
customary law, but to other laws of evidence, 
civil and criminal procedure where applicable. 
As noted earlier, the current formulation of the 
TCB does specifically mandate that section 
35(5) should apply in customary courts because 
it only requires that the customary law of 
procedure shall apply to traditional courts.60 The 
TCB therefore provides an enabling environment 
for the traditional courts to disregard the police 
in the investigation of cases. The possible 
rights violations that may result must be 
carefully considered.
The process of admission of evidence is a 
technical aspect of the administration of justice, 
and requires that traditional leaders appreciate 
these concepts. In S v Zuko,61 the court 
provided four factors that may form the basis 
for refusing to admit certain evidence. These 
are: a lack of good faith on the part of vigilantes; 
an inability to justify their conduct in terms of 
public safety or emergency; the seriousness of 
the violation of the appellants’ rights to privacy, 
freedom and security of person and dignity; 
and, finally, the availability of lawful means 
to acquire the evidence. Since these factors 
enhance the right to a fair trial right from the pre-
trial stages,61 the persons collecting evidence 
should be able to appreciate the consequences 
that arise from their actions. As such, if an 
individual is going to collect evidence, s/he 
ought to know that failing to follow the required 
procedure, and violating the provisions in the Bill 
of Rights in the course of collecting evidence, 
will lead to its probable exclusion.
Conclusion and recommendations
The failure to create a framework for the 
collection and admission of evidence in the 
TCB dents the proposed fusion of the Bill of 
Rights as the cornerstone to the proposed 
law. In the long run, empirical research on the 
rules governing the collection and admission 
of evidence in criminal cases is needed to 
establish how traditional courts fare in this 
regard, and how a fusion of section 35(5) may 
be applied. 
In the interim, if the quality of evidence that is 
admitted in the traditional courts is to match 
the constitutional directive under section 35(5), 
criminal cases should be left to the normal 
courts, unless the parties categorically wish to 
use the traditional courts. For this to happen, 
both parties have to be willing to use the 
traditional courts. However, customary law at 
times requires that a person follow it, regardless 
of his perceptions. Consider a hypothetical 
where A is wrongly accused of malicious 
damage to the property of B. As such, A is 
required to come to the traditional court for 
either reconciliation or paying compensation, 
as a way of averting possible imprisonment 
in the magistrates’ court. The evidence used 
to incriminate A may violate his rights to a fair 
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hearing and the presumption of innocence. 
Such a scenario illuminates a consent that 
may be obtained through undue influence by 
B – perhaps facilitated or supported by the 
traditional court. This position pits A against 
the desires of B, in a court they would not have 
originally gone to. As a result, the outcome of 
the matter in the traditional court is, to a great 
extent, based on evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. 
If criminal cases are to be handled by the 
traditional courts, the police should play an 
oversight role to ensure that the evidence used 
is properly obtained and admitted – albeit in an 
informal manner. Traditional leaders ought to 
have some training on how to interrogate the 
nature of the evidence that is brought before 
their courts, to ensure that the protections 
against discrimination extend to ensuring that 
evidence that is admitted is properly collected.
To comment on this article visit 
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